Dereliction of duty Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam
Examines the decisions made between 1963 and 1965 in regards to escalating United States involvement in the Vietnam War and looks at how early mistakes in policy formation were constantly repeated throughout the Johnson administration.
| Main Author: | McMaster, H. R., 1962- |
|---|---|
| Format: | Books Print Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York :
HarperPerennial,
1998.
|
| Edition: | 1st HarperPerennial ed. |
| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- The new frontiersmen and the old guard : 1961-October 1962
- Havana and Hanoi : October 1962-November 1963
- New war, new leader : November 1963-January 1964
- Graduated pressure : January-March 1964
- From distrust to deceit : March-July 1964
- Across the threshold : July-August 1964
- Contriving consensus : August-September 1964
- Prophesies rejected and the path of least resistance : September-November 1964
- Planning for failure : November-December 1964
- A fork in the road : December 1964-February 1965
- The foot in the door : February-March 1965
- A quicksand of lies : March-April 1965
- The coach and his team : April-June 1965
- War without direction : April-June 1965
- Five silent men : July 1965
- Epilogue.